Monthly Newsletter

EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR NEWS

Mickey Busca, editor

February, 2012

 COCONNECTICUT CONNECTICUT SUPREME COURT TO RULE ON TWO EMPLOYMENT CASES

     On January 31, 2012, the Connecticut Supreme Court heard oral argument on two cases that will reverberate through employment law in Connecticut.  One concerns an interpretation of our discrimination laws, the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, ("CFEPA"), and the other impacts our Connecticut Family and Medical Leave Act.

     In Patino v. Birken Manufacturing Co., the Court will decide whether a hostile work environment claim can be asserted under Section 46a-81c of CFEPA and whether the evidence submitted at trial was sufficient to establish the existence of a hostile work environment.

     The plaintiff, Luis Patino, was employed by the defendant, Birken Manufacturing Company as a machinist.  Beginning in 1991, some of Patino's coworkers began calling him derogatory homosexual names, not to his face, but in his presence.  In 2005, Patino sued Birken under Section 46a-81c of CFEPA, claiming that Birken failed to prevent its employees from creating a hostile work environment on the basis of his sexual orientation.

     At trial, the jury returned a verdict for Patino.  Birken appealed to the Supreme Court.  It argued that (1) there is no cause of action for a hostile work environment claim under Section 46a-81c; (2) even if the statute provides for a hostile work environment claim on the basis of sexual orientation, there was insufficient evidence to support such a claim because the derogatory words were not directed at him.

     MY PREDICTION:   The Connecticut Supreme Court will affirm the trial court's decisions and the jury award.  It will establish that a claim for hostile work environment can be made for sexual orientation, like any other protected category, i.e., race, color, creed, religion, mental or physicial disability and sex.  Also, the Court will establish that the work environment was both subjectively and objectively hostile to Patino, similar to federal case law precedent, to establish that the derogatory words need not be directed at him to support such a claim.  We shall see .....

     In the second case, Velez v. State of Connecticut, Department of Labor, the Court will decide whether employees who do not work in Connecticut should be counted in determining whether an employer has seventy-five or more employees for purposes of the state's Family and Medical Leave Act, 31-51kk(4).

     Velez filed a complaint with the Connecticut Department of Labor alleging that her employer, Related Management Company, had violated Connecticut's family and medical leave law in firing her.  The Department dismissed her complaint, finding that the company was not subject to Section 31-51kk(4), because it employed on thirty-five employees in Connecticut.  The statute defines "employer" as one who "employs seventy-five or more employees."  

     Velez appealed to the Connecticut Superior Court.  That court disagreed with the company, stating that since there was no geographic limitation on counting employees, out-of-state employees of the company could be counted to meet the seventy-five employee threshold.  

     NO PREDICTION HERE.   In the face of two department of labor decisions that concluded that 31-51kk(4) did not allow the counting of out-of-state employees, which the court stated were unreasonable, I have no idea how the Supreme Court will rule.

U.S. SUPREME COURT RULES FIRST AMENDMENT BARS SUITS BY MINISTERS

AGAINST THEIR EMPLOYER CHURCHES CLAIMING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION.

     In a case decided on January 11, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment bars suits brought on behalf of ministers against their churches, claiming termination in violation of employment discrimination laws.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC.

     The Church had two categories of "teachers:"  lay teachers and "called" teachers.  Called teachers had more rigorous academic training, including theological study,and were commissioned as "ministers."

     Cheryl Perich was designated as a called teacher/minister.  She developed narcolepsy and began the 2004-2005 school year on disability leave.

     Although she attempted to return to her job in January, 2005, the school claimed they had already contracted with a lay teacher to fill her absence for the entire school year.  Perich was ultimately fired for insubordination and disruptive behavior.  She filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission which eventually brought suit against the church claiming retaliation for threatening to file a disability suit in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act.

     The suit was dismissed at the district court level on the basis of the "ministerial exception", but reversed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

     The Supreme Court, in dismissing the suit, held that the "ministerial exception," grounded in the First Amendment, bars the application of any discrimination laws concerning the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD DECISION RULES

 EMPLOYEES CAN'T BE REQUIRED TO SIGN AGREEMENTS PREVENTING CLASS ACTIONS.

     Finally, in a case decided on January 3, 2012, the National Labor Relations Board held that when an employer requires employees to sign an agreement prohibiting them from filing joint, class, or collective claims addressing their wages, hours of other working conditions against their employer in any arbitration or court action, such conduct violates Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act.  D.R. Horton, Inc. and Michael Cuda, Case No. 12-CA-25764.

     One important note that is usually lost by employers, although the NLRA is the federal law governing private sector collective bargaining, i.e. union contracts with management, the NLRA is far reaching and can extend to protecting certain employee rights in a non-union work environment.